While Damascus and the Levant prepare to receive their spiritual spring with the Prophet Muhammad’s (peace be upon him) birthday, this year’s atmosphere is clouded with fear and suspicion—not merely for security or economic reasons, but due to recent shifts within Syria's power structure under President Ahmed Al‑Shar’ and his administrative team. Many among them lean toward a Salafist doctrinal school that rejects celebrations of the Prophet’s birthday—and some of their clerics have even excommunicated those who observe it.

In contrast, the majority of Syrians—especially in Damascus, Aleppo, and other governorates—follow a moderate Sufi-oriented faith that regards the Mawlid as a luminous and educational occasion, an untouchable religious and social heritage. Any attempt to abolish it could cause a rupture between the state and society, and between authority and popular sentiment.

The Mawlid in Levantine Islamic Popular Memory:

Damascus has been celebrating the Mawlid for centuries—in homes, mosques, and Sufi khanqahs (Naqshbandi, Rifa’i, Qadiri, and Jilani)—at landmarks like the Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaru Mosque, the Umayyad Mosque, the Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi Mosque, the Tawba Mosque, and in markets like Al-Hamidia, Souq al-Sanjqadar, Saroujah, and Al-Hariqah. Ceremonies include devotional chants, praise poetry, sweets distribution, and lighting of mosques. The Mawlid has helped guard society against extremism, renew the covenant of compassion and balance, and resist radical flows. Any move to suppress it would be seen as an attack on local religious identity and intrusion into people’s sacred customs—not merely a jurisprudential opinion.

Political and Administrative Dimension under President Ahmed Al‑Shar’:

The new administration under President Ahmed Al‑Shar’ faces a delicate test as Rabi' al-Awwal approaches. Will it allow religious diversity—common in stable societies—or impose a single doctrinal vision on a population with diverse faith traditions and legacies?
Prohibiting the Mawlid or enforcing a singular ritual would spark social tension and ignite a political-religious debate over the identity of the state: Is it a nation for all Syrians, or for one ideological tendency?

Smart and Practical Options to Avoid Sectarian Drift and Build Social Cohesion:

1. Establish a Religious Consultative Council with representatives from Sufi, Salafist, and traditional religious authorities to formulate flexible, pluralistic religious policies.
2. Adopt a policy of “neither prohibition nor enforcement”: allow communities to celebrate autonomously, prohibit incitement or denunciation.
3. Reinstate the Ministry of Endowments as a unifying umbrella, organizing celebrations under a national slogan like “The Prophet’s Love Unites Us.”
4. Promote civil–cultural events like book fairs, literary evenings, and heritage recitals—alongside devotional ones—to engage the wider community.
5. Issue a rational presidential statement defending religious diversity: “Syria belongs to all its children…no single school or current dominates...love of the Prophet transcends sect.”
6. Involve moderate scholars—like Mufti Osama Al‑Rifa’i—in public dialogue to craft inclusive religious narratives.
7. Use the Mawlid as a moment for calm and mercy—a celebration of love, not a flashpoint for sectarian division.

Conclusion:
The Mawlid in Syria this year is more than a religious occasion—it is a social and political platform with potential for unity or division. Both supporters and opponents of its celebration claim Prophet‑centered motivations—yet if love for the Prophet becomes a cause for schism, it reveals misinterpretation. Let Syria choose love that fosters tolerance, not fuel for conflict.