Syria under both Assad the father and the son was saturated with many injustices, chief among them being the “injustice suffered by the Kurdish component.”

We may briefly summarize the most significant aspects of this injustice as follows:

1. Many Kurds were denied the right to Syrian citizenship and were instead considered stateless, carrying red-colored identity documents.
2. Kurdish names were not permitted to be registered in official state records.
3. Kurdish celebrations and cultural heritage, such as Nowruz, were banned and erased.
4. Kurds were denied advancement to higher military ranks in the Syrian army, starting from the rank of “Staff Officer.”
5. The Kurdish language was suppressed and not recognized as an official language.

For all these reasons, it was not surprising that Syrian Kurds were among the first to rise up against the Assad regime in 2011.
Their recent Syrian history bears witness to multiple uprisings, the most notable being the Qamishli events of 2004, the 2005 protests following the assassination of Sheikh Mashouq Al-Khaznawi, and others.

The Kurdish component has suffered severe deprivation of their political, social, and even human rights.
It is our duty to rectify these wrongs and to ensure that no Syrian component—especially the Kurdish one—faces such injustices again.

A Realistic View

Following the Syrian revolution and the entry of ISIS, the international coalition, the Turks, the Russians, and the Iranians:
There is no doubt that the Syrian scene—particularly—has become complex in its features.
The negative influence of foreign powers on the Syrian file—generally—is clearly evident.

We, in the Research and Studies Department of the Scientific Office of the Syrian Future Movement, presented an extensive research paper explaining the Kurdish situation, titled:
“An Objective Reading of the Relationship Between the SDF and the Political Opposition.”

For this reason, it became necessary for the Kurdish component to unify its various currents.
This is for Syria first, and for the advancement of the Kurdish component in particular.
It is to prevent their sacrifices from being lost in the chaos of intersecting international interests and the narrow regional agendas that influence the Syrian file according to their own calculations.

We can say that we are capable of being the balancing point in this file.
Its role may be summarized across three levels:

First Level: Internal Relations

We consider ourselves one of the key Syrian political forces operating within Syria but outside the regime’s control.
We represent part of the Arab component and part of the Kurdish component as well.
We maintain healthy communication with all segments of the Syrian people inside the country.
We enjoy significant popularity within the Arab revolutionary base in both northern and southern Syria, reaching even the heart of Sweida.

We carry a national political vision that is free on one hand, and a moderate religious stance on the other.
This grants us a respected position within Syrian popular circles.

Second Level: Relations With the Diverse Syrian Opposition

We have gained credibility due to several factors, including:
Representing religious moderation, political patriotism, and systematic democracy.
Maintaining positive relations with all Syrian factions despite their differences, based on mutual respect and cooperation.
Financial integrity and intellectual and administrative independence in all its dimensions.

Third Level: International Relations

These have made us a Syrian actor friendly to the international community as a whole.
We have official recognition in the United States and maintain active communication with all American entities—political and otherwise.
This has brought positive outcomes for Syria and its people over the past decade.

We also have strong friendships with Europeans and Turks at all political and security levels.

From this foundation, we believe that a relationship with Erbil would add geopolitical depth on one hand.
On the other, it would provide our friends in Erbil with a genuine Syrian extension, both internally and externally.

Conclusion:

There is no doubt that the Syrian situation—especially regarding the Kurdish issue—is deeply complex and sensitive.
This is particularly evident after recent Arab tribal movements in the eastern region.
These may be a genuine indication of the need to build a strong and real social contract that secures the rights of all Syrian components.

We hope that Erbil will play an active role in pushing this forward.

With our healthy relations with the Syrian interior and opposition on one side, and with the Americans on the other,
We are laying the foundation for two key points:

First:
A central and precise role in resolving Syria’s major issues—especially the Kurdish issue—which we in the Syrian Future Movement recognize and deeply value.

Second:
The need for those interested in Syrian affairs generally—and Kurdish affairs specifically—to recognize the importance of this role and the position that the Syrian Future Movement holds.

For this reason, we highly value any coordination and cooperation with our brothers in Erbil that serves the interests of both our peoples—especially our Kurdish brethren.