Introduction:

An Entry into the Centrality of Damascus in Political Rule:

Damascus has always served as the nucleus of governance and administration in Syria throughout the ages.

Its political stability has been historically linked to the participation of its notables, elders, and dignitaries in the structure of power.

Historically, the interaction between rulers and the city's elite has proven to be a decisive factor in shaping the political landscape.

Experience has shown that excluding these elites from decision-making leads to political turmoil and administrative failure.

Today, with a growing sense among Damascenes that the new power holders are neglecting the city’s notables, the essential question resurfaces:

Can Damascus be ruled successfully without the consent of its traditional elites?

Historical Context:

During the Ottoman era, Damascus stood as one of the empire's major administrative centers, with its notables playing a pivotal role in ensuring governance stability.

Political tensions arose whenever the Ottoman authorities attempted to diminish the influence of these elites or appoint foreign governors disconnected from the city's social fabric.

Key events include:

– The dismissal of Governor Darwish Pasha in 1585, following protests led by Damascus' notables over excessive taxation and poor governance.

– The 19th-century Ottoman reforms that marginalized prominent families like Al-Azm and Al-Omari, sparking political unrest in the city.

When Ibrahim Pasha entered Damascus, he sought the loyalty of the local elite through administrative and economic privileges.

However, his imposition of conscription was met with rejection, leading to the 1834 uprising that compelled him to use military force to suppress it.

The French, upon their arrival in Syria, repeated the mistake of ignoring traditional Damascene elites.

They opted to engage marginal figures or outsiders, believing this would weaken the resistance’s societal base.

Yet, this marginalization widened the gap between them and the local society, sparking political and social discontent that culminated in a series of uprisings—most notably the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925, which was led or supported by key national figures linked to Damascus’ traditional class, such as Fakhri Al-Baroudi and Saadallah Al-Jabiri.

As public rejection escalated, the French realized their error in ignoring Damascus' elites and the risk of alienating genuine social foundations.

They attempted to incorporate certain elite families into local administration and autonomous governance.

However, these efforts came too late and remained inadequate, as most elite figures aligned with the national movement and became pillars of the opposition.

Among them stood out key figures such as Hashim Al-Atassi, who led political efforts for independence; Faris Al-Khoury, renowned for his negotiation skills and defense of Syrian sovereignty; and Abdul Rahman Al-Shahbandar, who spearheaded resistance efforts on the ground.

After Syria’s independence from French occupation in 1946, Damascus' notables played a central role in political life.

They derived their legitimacy from their historical and societal standing and ties to the national movement.

Leaders such as Shukri Al-Quwatli, Jamil Mardam Bey, and Saadallah Al-Jabiri were prominent in the National Party and National Bloc.

They worked toward establishing a civil state based on constitutional pluralism and played a crucial role in balancing internal and regional forces.

However, the 1949 coup by Husni Al-Za’im marginalized traditional elites in favor of military rule, causing recurrent political instability due to escalating tensions between the military and civilians.

When Hafez Al-Assad assumed power in 1970, he adopted a dual approach toward Damascus' elites:

• He excluded traditional political elites such as the Al-Quwatli, Al-Azm, and Mardam Bey families.

• He co-opted commercial and administrative families like Al-Mahayni, Al-Shihabi, Al-Qabbani, Al-Bizri, Al-Munajjid, and Al-Sanqar, assigning them limited roles in the economy and giving them controlled positions in chambers of commerce and industry.

Their task was to ensure economic circulation and enhance the regime's image in Damascus, provided they maintained complete loyalty, without playing any real political role.

In parallel, he engineered new elites from rural or sectarian backgrounds and promoted alternative Sunni figures to fulfill symbolic roles disconnected from Damascus' deep-rooted social fabric.

Thus, Hafez Al-Assad dismantled the historic role of the capital’s elites and reshaped the elite structure to serve a closed security regime that rejected partnership and bore no connection to historical legitimacy.

Under Bashar Al-Assad’s rule, the power structure underwent a radical shift in elite composition.

The political and economic elite transitioned from traditional Damascene families—who for decades symbolized the city’s political and social identity—toward a new class of compliant businessmen.

These figures formed undisclosed partnerships with the regime, driven by loyalty and dependency rather than merit or social standing.

Their interests came to dominate the national economy, monopolizing the market through privileged access to regime favors, while excluding those outside this tight circle.

This corrupt alliance between wealth and power systematically marginalized Damascus' historic elites.

It dismantled the political and social fabric that had long defined the city and imposed a hybrid class of newly minted notables fabricated in the dungeons of security agencies rather than through societal struggle or historical legacy.

These new figures served as hollow facades, lacking depth and social legitimacy, leading to a clear disruption of Damascus’ social structure and a deliberate confusion of societal norms.

Can Damascus Be Governed Without the Consent of Its Notables?

This question imposes itself forcefully upon reading the current Damascene scene.

Since the early days of Syria’s national rule, Damascus has represented more than just an administrative capital—it has symbolized legitimacy and served as the balancing point between the state and society.

A century of Syrian experience confirms that marginalizing Damascus’ notables has never been a viable or lasting strategy.

The noble families, societal leaders, and symbolic figures who shaped the city’s political and cultural history were not mere ornaments, but rather consensus-builders and stabilizers of governance.

Today, with President Ahmad Al-Sharaa leading the country, concerns are growing about a repeat of exclusionary practices under new labels.

Many Damascenes sense deliberate neglect toward the city’s historic houses and elites—those who long contributed to decision-making and maintaining equilibrium—reviving the memory of failed past policies.

To prevent this issue from becoming a full-blown crisis, a smart approach is required to redefine the relationship between power and the capital through three primary tracks:

1. Restoring recognition of elites in their broad civic sense by integrating academics, community figures, guild leaders, and moderate religious authorities into the public landscape, rather than limiting representation to bureaucratic or security roles.

2. Establishing an independent and influential Damascene Honor Council, composed of trusted, symbolically representative individuals tasked with advising the state and reflecting the city’s collective mood to rebuild the societal-political bridge.

3. Empowering local elected institutions in Damascus by strengthening municipal roles, activating decentralization, and expanding the authority of local councils to make Damascenes partners rather than spectators.

4. Allocating seats in the next People's Assembly for genuine notables appointed directly by the President, as a symbolic yet effective gesture that reaffirms official recognition of the Damascene elite and grants them space for legitimate expression and oversight within legislative institutions.

Conclusion:

Damascus has never been a mere geographic capital.

It has always been the center of legitimacy, history, and Syrian identity.

Whoever governs it needs more than authority—he needs legitimacy born from the city's social fabric, especially its traditional elites.

History proves that sidelining these elites incurs political costs and triggers internal disruptions with national repercussions.

In this historic turning point, with President Ahmad Al-Sharaa ascending to power, the central question arises once more:

Will he recreate a governance model that respects Damascus’ uniqueness and listens to its symbols, or will he pursue an alternative route that attempts to reengineer legitimacy apart from the city’s notables?

Numerous historical episodes reveal that alignment with Damascus’ elites has been not a tactical choice, but a strategic necessity.

Any effort to bypass this truth has consistently led to societal withdrawal or political backlash that complicates governance.

Accordingly, building lasting stability requires an accurate reading of Damascus’ equation and its internal dynamics.

Our recommendations in this regard are based on six core pillars:

1. Institutionalizing partnership with traditional Damascene elites through consultative councils or representational structures that safeguard their historic status and renew their role in policymaking.

2. Striking a balance between rising talents and influential families through an administrative model that combines heritage with modern expertise, preventing dominance by any one side.

3. Adopting a policy of deliberate inclusion instead of reckless exclusion to immunize the capital against recurring tensions produced by past isolationist approaches.

4. Learning from the capital’s political memory as a reservoir of successes and failures, and avoiding the repetition of mistakes that drove a wedge between governance and society.

5. Respecting the unique character of Damascus when proposing reform programs to prevent societal backlash that may derail or empty reforms of their substance.

6. Rebuilding trust between the state and Damascene society through socially and economically meaningful initiatives that restore balance and offer residents a genuine sense of partnership in shaping the future.

Ignoring these realities will push the new government into a silent yet deep confrontation, possibly resulting in the loss of Damascus—not as land, but as a political and societal anchor—an outcome no national project seeking stability and openness can afford.