Introduction:

The Syrian political landscape witnessed a significant shift with the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 66 of 2025, which restructured the electoral mechanism and the conditions for forming the People’s Assembly. 

This opened the door for substantial debate on the future of legislative representation, institutional independence, and the prospects for political reform within the current balance of power.

While this decree has been welcomed as a step toward rebuilding the legislative institution—an endorsement reiterated by the Syrian Future Movement in its statement on Saturday, June 14, 2025—a deeper analysis of this electoral model reveals fundamental concerns regarding the nature of representation. 

These include the role of political parties and the ability of the upcoming Assembly to function as an independent legislative body free from executive influence.

Theoretically, the decree represents a restructuring of a legislative institution long criticized for its limited influence on public policy and sovereign decision-making.

It introduces a new electoral mechanism, redistributes seats based on specific social categories, and allows the President to appoint one-third of the Assembly's members. These changes raise essential questions: Is this a step toward genuine political reform or merely a reproduction of centralized governance?

From a philosophical perspective, restructuring the People's Assembly reflects a broader framework related to the concept of political representation and its alignment with democratic legitimacy, political pluralism, and institutional autonomy. 

Legislative transformations in any state must go beyond procedural adjustments and embody a genuine political will to create a more representative and inclusive governance environment.

From a political science standpoint, the legislative body is the cornerstone of power distribution between institutions. 

The definition of its functions and powers reflects the nature of the state and its political orientation. 

Therefore, any restructuring of the Assembly must be carefully examined to avoid undermining its role in oversight and policymaking and to prevent its transformation into a ceremonial body subordinate to the executive branch.

This article offers a comprehensive analysis of Decree No. 66 of 2025 by examining its theoretical and practical foundations and exploring its potential impact on Syria’s political landscape. 

It focuses on whether it promotes effective democracy, institutional independence, and inclusive decision-making among all political and social forces.

The Concept of Political Representation: Between Elitism and Democracy

Political representation has always been central to philosophical and political discourse about governance and who should have the right to participate in decision-making. 

With the issuance of Decree No. 66 in Syria, a new model has emerged by dividing the People’s Assembly into two categories: notables and intellectuals. 

This raises critical questions about whether this model ensures political pluralism or reproduces an elitist structure seeking to maintain dominance within the legislative scene.

Defining membership based on these two categories revives the age-old philosophical question: Who is best suited to govern? Should rulers be those with historical and social influence or those with political knowledge and intellectual expertise? While the model may seek a balance between influence and specialization, it poses several challenges:

1. The decree fails to precisely define "notables" and "intellectuals," opening the door to non-transparent appointments that could lead to elitist dominance.

2. This classification risks excluding other societal groups, such as workers and farmers, who were historically part of Syria's political structure.

3. Focusing solely on these two categories could strip the Assembly of broad representation, as true representation should encompass the full spectrum of Syrian society.

Throughout political thought—from Plato to Habermas—there is a clear distinction between elitist governance by experts and notables and the democratic model based on open popular choice. In Syria, restructuring Assembly membership in this way raises the question: Does this reflect a move toward representative democracy, or does it signal a new form of centralized decision-making?

The success of any legislative body depends on its ability to represent the full social and political diversity of the society. Excluding other groups from the new structure may result in:

1. Weakening the pluralistic nature of the legislative institution and turning it into a pre-determined elitist body.

2. Limiting public participation in political life, especially if members are chosen through non-transparent methods or pre-arranged political deals.

3. The absence of political parties in the legislative scene exacerbates the issue, as non-partisan representation weakens political effectiveness.

Based on current criteria, this new decree redefines political representation within a new elitist framework that may lead to the reproduction of existing dominance rather than building a pluralistic model. 

If the selection mechanism relies on subcommittees rather than open elections, it raises further concerns about the independence of those committees. Moreover, the focus on notables and intellectuals may skew representation toward serving as an advisory body to the political system rather than functioning as an independent authority reflecting true societal diversity.

The formation of the new People’s Assembly under this model raises significant concerns about the nature of political representation and whether it truly meets the demands of democratic transformation. 

In the absence of political parties and clear selection mechanisms, deeper reforms are needed to ensure that Syria’s legislative institution reflects the people's will rather than becoming an extension of a politically dominant elite.

Executive-Legislative Relations: The Presidential Third Dilemma

Balancing executive and legislative powers is a key principle in democratic governance. 

The independence of the legislative body ensures oversight, lawmaking, and the expression of the people's will, free from executive influence. 

However, Decree No. 66 of 2025 raises fundamental concerns by allowing the President to appoint one-third of the People’s Assembly members, prompting questions about the Assembly's ability to operate independently.

Politically, appointing 50 out of 150 members gives the President significant leverage within the Assembly. 

This third could become a decisive voting bloc that supports executive-friendly decisions or blocks undesired reform legislation. 

This creates a legislative imbalance, where the ability to pass laws and make critical decisions depends on alignment between the elected majority and the presidential appointees, potentially undermining the Assembly's independence and limiting its ability to hold the government accountable or propose reform-aligned legislation.

In some democratic systems, members are appointed to legislative bodies from academia, civil society, or business sectors to enrich political dialogue. 

However, the Syrian model here appears to directly bolster executive power within the legislature, especially in a post-Assad era where centralism remains a threat.

In robust democracies, the executive and legislative branches maintain a complementary relationship, with legislation remaining subject to free debate within the Assembly, without direct presidential influence. 

In Syria’s case, this presidential third creates the potential for indirect steering of Assembly decisions through the appointment of loyal or executive-aligned individuals.

Thus, the legislative body risks becoming:

1. Weak in holding the executive accountable, as aligned voting blocs may support the government unconditionally.

2. An obstacle to reform legislation that contradicts presidential preferences.
3. An advisory council rather than an independent lawmaking institution, thereby undermining democratic principles.

To resolve this issue, the percentage of presidential appointments should be reduced, or a transparent and impartial mechanism established for their selection.

Tying these appointments to strict oversight requirements could reduce their use as a political influence tool. 

The issue of the presidential third is not merely procedural—it directly concerns the structure of the state and the future of its legislative process. 

It must therefore be thoroughly reassessed to ensure that the People’s Assembly becomes a true democratic representative body rather than an arm of the executive branch.
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Absence of Political Parties: Are We Witnessing the Reproduction of a Non-Pluralistic System?

Modern democracy is fundamentally linked to party pluralism. 

Political parties are the backbone of any system that seeks to represent the interests of society and organize political life. 

Yet, under the current decree, the restructuring of the People’s Assembly seems to omit any mention of the role of political parties—whether traditional or revolutionary—raising critical concerns about the nature of Syria’s future political landscape.

The exclusion of political parties from the framework for forming the new Assembly presents two possibilities:

1. It may be a temporary measure pending the issuance of a new law governing political parties, with the aim of integrating them into the process at a later stage.

2. It may reflect a deliberate strategy to maintain control over the political scene through independent figures, limiting the emergence of structured political platforms capable of competing and proposing alternative policies.

If it is the former, then excluding parties at this foundational stage weakens the democratic credibility of the Assembly. 

If it is the latter, the absence of parties points to a non-pluralistic model in which citizens cannot choose between distinct political visions, and appointments are made based on personal alignments or unofficial political understandings.

Historically, political systems without organized parties have struggled to build effective legislatures. 

In such cases, membership is often determined by personal loyalty or informal political arrangements. In Syria’s case, excluding parties may lead to:

1. Weak political engagement within the Assembly, as debates and legislation would lack clear political direction in the absence of party blocs.

2. Monopolization of political decision-making by the executive, with no organized opposition to present alternative visions.

3. The inability to form influential political forces within the Assembly that could drive legislation aligned with societal aspirations.

This exclusion of parties raises serious doubts about Syria’s commitment to political pluralism. 

The electoral process seems more like a restructuring exercise within a centralized vision than a shift toward comprehensive democratic reform. 

If this model continues, it may lead to:

1. A weakened political arena lacking genuine competition, with representation confined to unaligned individuals.

2. A legislature that has little influence over political decisions, as the executive retains control over the process in the absence of balancing party forces.

3. Public disillusionment with the political process, viewing the new Assembly not as a voice of the people, but as a ceremonial body lacking true pluralism.

The omission of political parties from this legislative process is a fundamental flaw in the path toward reform. 

Without a clear party law and mechanisms to integrate them into the political process, this new legislative structure risks becoming a continuation of a centralized model that does not reflect genuine public will.

The Role of the Supreme Electoral Committee: Oversight or Control?

The formation of the Supreme Electoral Committee for the People’s Assembly elections marks a pivotal point in the reorganization of Syria’s electoral process.

Tasked with overseeing the formation of the sub-electoral bodies that will elect two-thirds of the Assembly members—while the President appoints the remaining third—the question arises: Is this committee a neutral supervisory body, or a political tool?

The decree assigns the committee a purely organizational role with no legislative or executive authority, meaning it will not be part of the new Assembly. 

However, the composition of the committee raises concerns about its neutrality, as some of its members are affiliated with former Syrian opposition groups like the Syrian National Coalition or linked to previously armed groups such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. 

This suggests that the committee may be used to manage political balances rather than ensuring electoral fairness.

Moreover, the decree does not define the committee’s term limits or the timeline for forming the sub-electoral bodies. 

This opens the door to indefinite delays that could undermine the credibility of the electoral process. 

In established democracies, election committees operate under strict deadlines to maintain the integrity of the electoral timeline. 

In Syria’s case, the lack of such clarity risks turning the committee into a tool for political engineering rather than a neutral body.

Additionally, while the committee oversees the elections, the constitutional declaration limits the Assembly’s authority over the executive branch to merely hearing reports, weakening its oversight role. 

This means that the committee, despite its technical function, may not be able to enforce strong electoral integrity standards—especially if it is subject to political influence.

To ensure the committee’s neutrality and legitimacy:

* Its mandate must be time-bound, with a clear deadline for completing its duties.

* Its composition must be reconsidered to guarantee independence from political affiliations.

* Credible international or independent local observers should be included to oversee the electoral process.

* The committee’s relationship with the future Assembly should be clarified to prevent undue influence over legislative formation.

Ultimately, the committee must serve as a neutral electoral organizer—not a political broker. If not, the entire democratic process may be compromised.

Restructuring the People’s Assembly: Between Democratic Transition and Political Postponement

One of the most critical issues raised by the decree is the term length of the newly formed People’s Assembly and the possibility of its extension before transitioning to a fully elected body. 

This is not a mere administrative matter—it speaks directly to the regime’s sincerity in pursuing a democratic transition or whether this is just an open-ended transitional stage without clear guarantees for holding free elections.

Under the current constitutional declaration, the Assembly’s term is set at 30 months, renewable. This raises several concerns:

1. Without strict legal safeguards, elections may be postponed indefinitely, keeping the legislative branch under temporary political arrangements rather than direct public mandate.

2. A lack of public pressure to end the transition phase could erode the Assembly’s legitimacy over time.

3. In many political systems, terms are extended due to instability—but this can become a pretext for obstructing democratic development. Syria must avoid this trap.

The decree does not clarify its relationship to the constitutional declaration, nor does it specify whether the Assembly will have full legislative authority or remain under provisional political arrangements. 

Without clarity, the Assembly risks functioning as a transitional political body rather than a sovereign legislature.

In some countries, transitional procedures are codified to ensure a structured shift from temporary governance to permanent institutions. 

But in Syria’s case, a legal vacuum may be exploited to indefinitely prolong the current setup. 

Without a clear framework for direct elections after the 30-month term, the new Assembly may become:

1. A symbolic legislature with no real political power.
2. A perpetually extended body justified by political instability.
3. A tool for reshaping the political scene without genuine democratic transition.

The duration of the People’s Assembly under the current framework is a key factor in Syria’s political future. Unless clear limits are imposed on its extension and real elections are scheduled, the transitional process could be prolonged indefinitely, blocking any path to true democratic reform.

Conclusion:

Presidential Decree No. 66 of 2025 represents a structural attempt to reshape Syria’s legislative process. 

However, it raises serious concerns regarding the independence of the Assembly, the absence of political pluralism, and the influence of the executive over legislative decisions. 

Building a strong legislative institution goes beyond modifying electoral procedures—it requires comprehensive reform that ensures true democratic representation and institutional autonomy.

Syria’s political future depends on whether the forthcoming legislative institutions can genuinely represent all segments of society, operate independently from executive dominance, and foster a pluralistic political environment with active public participation. 

Achieving this requires the implementation of a clear party law, limitations on the powers of the Supreme Electoral Committee, and guarantees of impartial electoral oversight—lest the restructuring of the Assembly become merely a reproduction of centralized political models.

Ultimately, the success of this process depends on the will of the Syrian people—through active participation in elections, pressure for political transparency, and demands for real reform aimed at building an inclusive democratic future.

Any political process that does not stem from the people's will remains incomplete and risks losing its legitimacy. 

Therefore, forming a legislative council that truly reflects the aspirations of Syrians is the decisive step toward building a more just and stable Syria.

Accordingly, I recommend the following to ensure a fair and independent legislative process in Syria:

First: Recommendations to the Political Leadership:

1. Reassess the presidential third to ensure the independence of the People’s Assembly and prevent it from becoming a ceremonial extension of the executive branch.

2. Seek a legal ruling to pass an exceptional and clear law regulating political parties so that the legislative body reflects political diversity, not just a gathering of unaffiliated figures.

3. Set strict timelines for completing the electoral process and prevent unjustified delays that would undermine the credibility of the transitional phase.

4. Activate genuine legislative oversight by granting the Assembly sufficient authority to hold the government accountable and steer public policy according to voters’ interests.

5. Initiate national dialogue channels among political and societal actors to build a broad consensus reflected in the composition of a representative People’s Assembly.

Second: Recommendations to the Supreme Electoral Committee:

1. Ensure the committee’s independence from political interference and limit its role to organizing the elections, not influencing their political outcomes.

2. Establish transparent criteria for selecting the sub-electoral bodies to ensure electoral integrity and prevent any form of political bargaining or unofficial agreements.

3. Involve trusted international or independent local monitoring bodies to ensure no political interference or irregularities affect the elections.

4. Define a clear electoral calendar with set milestones to guarantee a smooth transition to a popularly elected Assembly.

5. Approve a transparent legal appeals mechanism to allow candidates to challenge any electoral violations or misconduct.

Third: Recommendations to Civil Society:

1. Advocate for fair elections through awareness campaigns and grassroots monitoring of the electoral process.

2. Enhance public participation in political life by organizing seminars and workshops that explain the importance of legislative representation for Syria’s future.

3. Produce periodic monitoring reports on the progress of the elections to detect and prevent illegal or unethical interventions.

4. Demand broader representation for marginalized groups by advocating for an electoral law that guarantees social diversity within the Assembly.

5. Promote peaceful activism in support of political reform through national initiatives that foster dialogue across political and social divisions.

Fourth: Recommendations to Political Entities:

1. Form clear political blocs to ensure that the elections are driven by structured political programs, not just independent personalities.

2. Push for the inclusion of political parties in the electoral process so that the Assembly reflects national political activity rather than exclusive trends.

3. Propose well-thought-out political programs for the coming phase that contribute to shaping a clear roadmap for Syria’s political and legislative future.

4. Strengthen dialogue among political forces to prevent any single entity from monopolizing political decision-making.

5. Demand constitutional guarantees for the independence of the People’s Assembly so that it functions as a real legislative and oversight institution—not an executive tool.

Fifth: Recommendations to the Syrian People:

1. Participate actively in the elections through popular nomination committees to ensure legislative representation arises from the people’s will—not closed political deals.

2. Demand transparency in the electoral process and accountability for any actor that undermines election integrity.

3. Support reform-oriented political programs aimed at building strong and independent democratic institutions.

4. Engage with civil society and monitoring bodies to ensure the people's voice remains central to the political process.

5. Reject any attempt to reproduce political centralism that reinforces executive dominance over the legislature, and instead, demand an electoral process that guarantees legislative independence.

Building a strong, representative legislative institution for all Syrians requires deep political reform and strict safeguards to ensure electoral integrity and Assembly independence. 

Achieving this goal will require the joint effort of the political leadership, the Supreme Electoral Committee, civil society, political actors, and citizens themselves in pursuit of genuine reform that strengthens Syria’s democratic future.

Dr. Zaher Baadarani
Office of the Presidency
Essays