On Sunday, March 17, 2024, Geir Pedersen issued an invitation to the Syrian regime to come to Geneva and participate in the meeting of the Constitutional Committee at the end of April.

He stated: “I am afraid I have nothing new to tell you on this matter.

The situation in Syria is currently extremely difficult.

And I believe all indicators are pointing in the wrong direction, whether in terms of security, economy, or the political track.”

In light of these grim statements, we may express our position on both the Constitutional Committee and the Syrian Negotiation Commission.

The Negotiation Commission and the Constitutional Committee

The High Negotiations Committee of the Syrian opposition was established on December 10, 2015, during a meeting of Syrian opposition factions in Riyadh.

It was agreed that the committee would consist of 32 members, including nine from the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, ten from armed factions, five from the National Coordination Committee, and eight independents.

Its leadership rotated among various opposition figures, most notably its first chairman, Mr. Riyad Hijab.

At the Riyadh II Conference, held on November 22–23, 2017, the Syrian opposition selected a new version of the committee known as "Negotiation Commission II", which included 50 members in total.

This version comprised representatives from the National Coalition, the National Coordination Committee, the Moscow and Cairo platforms, independents, and delegates from military factions.
 

The president and deputy president of the Negotiation Commission are selected through internal meetings.

At the Riyadh II Conference, Mr. Nasr Al-Hariri was selected as chairman.

His selection was based on collective decisions made by the commission’s members.

Mr. Nasr Al-Hariri announced the end of his mandate as chairman of the High Negotiations Committee on June 12, 2020, because the internal rules of the commission did not allow for a third term.

After his term ended, Mr. Anas Al-Abdah was elected on June 13, 2020.

Two years later, for the first time, the Syrian Negotiation Commission held a meeting inside Syria, in the city of Al-Rai near the Turkish border in July 2022.


During this meeting, Mr. Badr Jamous was elected as the new chairman.
He was re-elected in August 2023.

The Constitutional Committee

The decision to establish the Constitutional Committee was part of the outcomes of the “Syrian National Dialogue Congress”, held in Sochi, Russia, on January 30–31, 2018, under the sponsorship of the three guarantor states: Turkey, Russia, and Iran.

This came after discussions in Geneva proposed the formation of the committee.

Several technical sessions had been held in Geneva and Lausanne.

At the time, the UN envoy Staffan de Mistura proposed the committee be formed in Geneva.

This was rejected by both Russia and the Syrian regime, who instead pushed for the National Dialogue Congress in Sochi, where the committee’s formation was confirmed.

After more than a year and a half of consultations, UN Secretary-General António Guterres announced the formation of the Constitutional Committee on September 23, 2019, as part of efforts to resolve the crisis in Syria.

On November 4, 2019, the committee held its first meeting in Geneva to determine the agenda.

That session witnessed disputes and violations of the code of conduct governing the meetings.

Point of Order

We have deliberately stayed out of both the Negotiation Commission and the Constitutional Committee, although we could have participated.

We continued to observe closely, for several reasons, including:

1. Our early concern that members of the Negotiation Commission might consider themselves as sharing in sovereign power, treating it as a spoils system among themselves.

2. The presence of various factions within the commission holding divergent views on toppling Assad and interpreting UN Resolution 2254.
  There were deep-rooted disagreements among its components, and conflicting affiliations among its members based on the interests of states involved in the Syrian conflict.

3. Our view that all these efforts were dependent on international approval, paving the way for an imposed agreement far greater than the Syrian parties—regime and opposition—could control.
  The nearly two-year delay since their last meeting confirms this.

4. The shift from forming a transitional governing body (which should have created the constitutional committee) to the invention of the “Four Baskets”.
  The situation deteriorated to the point where the UN envoy considered his shuttle diplomacy and his success in arranging a meeting between the parties as if it were the conquest of Constantinople.

5. The Negotiation Commission never filed a formal objection throughout this entire period against the UN envoy’s failures and the waste of time without any tangible progress.

  They should have held him—and those backing and defending him—accountable, possibly demanding his replacement or directing blame toward those responsible for stalling the Constitutional Committee and its sessions.

On March 10 of this year, the Syrian Negotiation Commission announced its approval to send its representatives to attend the ninth round of the Constitutional Committee’s meetings, scheduled for April.

This came in a final statement issued after two days of meetings in Istanbul, during which the commission received a political briefing from its chairman, Mr. Badr Jamous, reviewed committee reports, and discussed the overall political situation.

Our Position

First, we note the following:

1. Remarks about the performance of the Syrian Negotiation Commission, particularly concerning its structure, which we see as a mixture of inconsistent components.

2. The Commission, like the Constitutional Committee, is dependent on foreign green or red lights—strongly tied to Russia, and to Turkey depending on political moods.

  Even if there was once a U.S.-Russian deal (Kerry–Lavrov), we believe that Russia, after the Ukraine war, lost its ability to persuade the international community.
  Thus, the hope for serious negotiations within the Constitutional Committee is currently almost nonexistent.

3. It is necessary for Syrian opposition institutions to be represented in the Constitutional Committee.

  We reject calls for the opposition to resign from its political responsibilities.
  We see its presence in the committee as a positive factor.

  We believe the Negotiation Commission still has a lot to do and can maneuver to create a favorable climate—especially after the tsunami of “Flood of Al-Aqsa” and its ripple effects—if we ride the waves wisely and create the balance that even powerful actors failed to achieve.

4. The Negotiation Commission seeks to align itself with the Turkish ally to maintain its support, particularly amid stagnation in Arab engagement.

  It is important to clarify our support for the components of the Commission that are united in the interest of the homeland and the implementation of UN resolutions through the Four Baskets discussed with the Syrian regime: transitional governance, constitution, elections, and counter-terrorism.

We emphasize the need for a political solution that meets the aspirations of our people, based on the following principles:

1. Firm insistence on the formation of a transitional governing body, without compromising on this demand.

2. No tolerance for further stalling, whether by the Syrian regime or the UN envoy—even if that leads to demanding his removal or replacement.

3. A binding timetable must be set for both parties.

4. A clear timetable must also be established for the other baskets.

5. Emphasis must be placed on confidence-building measures, such as the file of detainees and forcibly disappeared persons.

Conclusion:

We are carefully observing the efforts of the Syrian Negotiation Commission on one hand, and the Constitutional Committee on the other.

When we see either of them moving toward a national path for a comprehensive and sustainable solution, we will not only offer our thanks.

We will actively participate and share responsibility with others, driven by our national and historical duty imposed by current events and future developments.