Less than a year after the fall of the Assad regime, the outlines of a new phase in Syria began to emerge—its most defining feature: the fragmentation of the "allies’ alliance" and the surfacing of fault lines between the agendas of powers that once stood united behind Damascus.

What had seemed like a political-security honeymoon, leaving Syrians bewildered and exclaiming “wow, such love, consensus, and pilgrimage to Damascus!”, quickly turned into a marketplace of competing interests—an open regional and international contest.

1. Signs of Fragmentation

The “Conference on the Unity of Components” in Hasakah was not a local event, but a regional-international platform under French sponsorship and American silence—preparing the ground for a decentralization project in Syria.

The participation of religious figures representing the Druze and Alawite communities—both of whom clashed with the newly-formed Syrian army—was no mere protocol gesture. It was a signal of reviving the “minorities’ alliance” against the government and the Sunni majority (as previously noted).

At the same time, the three main Druze authorities aligned their discourse and strategy, banking on the Amman meeting—under American auspices—to establish a negotiating framework between Damascus and Druze leaders. If successful, it will mark a clear before-and-after moment.

2. Clashing Tracks and Files

French–Turkish rivalry over the Kurdish issue, and Turkish–Israeli competition over the south and the Druze file, have both become unmistakable indicators that external unity toward Damascus no longer holds.

Turkey (Fidan) sought to obstruct France (Macron), while Damascus froze its talks with the Kurds—reflecting shifting priorities in alliances.

3. Russia’s Return

The visit of a high-level Syrian delegation to Moscow, and its meeting with President Vladimir Putin, signaled Damascus’ decision to reopen the Russian gateway—seeking balance with the West, curbing Israeli maneuvers, securing the Syrian coast, and bolstering the military front in the northeast.

This cooperation, already visible on the ground, includes rearming the Syrian army, joint management of Hmeimim and Tartus bases, and potentially sensitive issues such as the assets and wealth of Bashar al-Assad (the plundered wealth of the people), alongside demands to extradite senior regime figures.

4. Security and Strategic Reading

From a security perspective, Syria is shifting from consolidating authority to managing intricate balances among four major military actors: the U.S., Turkey, Russia, and Israel.

From a strategic angle, these shifts open three possibilities:

• The slide into permanent zones of influence where decentralization evolves into actual power-sharing.
• A recalibration of alliances, positioning Damascus as a maneuvering hub between the West, Russia, and Turkey.
• Limited military escalation if local political understandings shift toward armed mobilization.

5. Out-of-the-Box Prospects

To mitigate fragmentation risks, Damascus could:

• Launch an internal security-development initiative addressing Kurdish and Druze concerns within a national framework (if time still allows).
• Leverage Russia’s return to create a “balance chamber” with the West and Israel, preventing escalation into direct confrontation.
• Open a discreet diplomatic track with states not directly involved in the conflict—such as Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and South Africa—to build a fresh support umbrella beyond traditional polarization.

In conclusion, what is unfolding in Syria today is not merely a reshuffling of allies, but the beginning of a long race to define the state’s future form and its place in the regional and international security equation. Whoever manages this race with intelligence and flexibility will shape the coming decade.