On Wednesday, August 6, 2025, the province of As-Suwayda witnessed a disturbing and controversial step, as the Higher Legal Committee—emanating from the spiritual leadership of the Druze community—announced the appointment of Brigadier General Shukib Ajoud Nasr as Commander of the Internal Security Forces in the province, under the pretext of serving the public interest!!

Although the national movement in As-Suwayda has, over the past years, presented a remarkable model of societal resilience and demands for the Syrian people’s political rights, this appointment, in my view, constitutes a real regression from the goals of the Syrian revolution, and from the broader vision Syrians aspired to as an alternative to the police security state.

We note the following:

1. Reproducing the tools of repression: Brigadier General Shukib Nasr previously served as head of the Political Security Branch in Tartus, and was part of the security apparatus linked to serious violations over the past decade—systematic repression, arbitrary arrests, and torture. His appointment, just eight months after the regime’s fall on December 18, 2024, sends a clear message that the Assad era is still present for some—down to the very same names!
2. Turning As-Suwayda into a haven for former regime officers: Choosing a security figure from the ousted regime in the heart of As-Suwayda reflects a dangerous trend to transform the province and its surroundings into a refuge for former regime officers. It confirms their presence and entrenchment within, thus reproducing the same closed, security-minded mentality aimed at fragmenting the Syrian state and deepening detachment from it. This path threatens the entire future of southern Syria and damages the image of any political or security alternative being promoted.
3. A blow to the credibility of local alternatives and decentralization: The Higher Legal Committee—established on June 12, 2025, as an initiative to build a civilian institutional model—faces a fundamental question: Is it a local authority for a different future, or merely a façade for recycling the mindset of Assad’s regime? Resorting to figures tied to the dark past does not offer an appealing or convincing picture of the decentralization being advocated, but rather suggests that “post-Assad” in the minds of these decision-makers may simply be a modified version of his rule.

Today, As-Suwayda is not only reproducing symbols of repression but also employing figures from the fallen regime as a spearhead against all who call for the unity of the Syrian state and its territorial integrity. This pushes the overall scene toward dangerous escalation with the new era on one hand, and with the people themselves on the other—people who see no alternative to the unity of Syrian territory and the full exercise of state authority over all its institutions (despite discordant voices here and there).